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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lawrence Scott Andrus appeals from the district court’s order denying his Rule 60(b) 
motion for relief from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In Andrus’s previous appeal, the Court of Appeals summarized this case’s procedural 
history and factual background as follows: 
In the underlying criminal case, Andrus was charged with felony driving 
under the influence of alcohol.  At trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.  Andrus 
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which was denied by the district court.  
Andrus appealed and this Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the 
sentence.  Thereafter, Andrus filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In 
response, the district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss, pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 19-4906(b).  The district court granted a motion for extension of time, but 
Andrus failed to reply within the thirty-day extension.  The district court 
dismissed Andrus’s petition for post-conviction relief with prejudice….  
 
Andrus v. State, Docket No. 44686, Unpublished Op. No. 335, pp.1-2 (Idaho App., January 24, 
2018).  Andrus timely appealed, id. at 2, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
summary dismissal of Andrus’s petition for post-conviction relief, id. at 4. 
While his appeal was pending, Andrus also filed a motion for relief from judgment 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  (R., pp.153-55.)  The district court denied the 
motion.  (R., pp.160-64.)  Andrus filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.171-75.) 
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ISSUE 
Andrus states the issue on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Andrus’ motion 
for relief from judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Andrus failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Rule 60(b) motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Andrus Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His 
Rule 60(b) Motion 
 
A. Introduction 
Andrus asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for 
relief from judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-
13.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows no abuse of the 
district court’s discretion.  The district court’s order denying relief should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court’s dismissal of motions brought under Rule 60(b) is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 578, 212 P.3d 1001, 1008 (2009). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion When It Denied Andrus’ Rule 60(b) 
Motion For Relief From Judgment 
 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final 
judgment or order for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
 
I.R.C.P. 60(b).  “Although the district court has broad discretion in deciding a Rule 60(b) 
motion, the motion may be granted only upon a showing of unique and compelling 
circumstances.”  Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 802, 69 P.3d 1059, 1063 (2003) (citing Miller 
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v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 607, 610 (1996)).  Moreover, the party seeking relief 
must also “show, plead or present evidence of facts which, if established, would constitute a 
meritorious defense to the action.”  Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 
P.2d 663, 670 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Below (and on appeal) Andrus claimed that his post-conviction counsel offered a 
complete absence of meaningful representation when he failed to file an amended petition or to 
respond to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss Andrus’s petition, and that this 
constituted unique and compelling circumstances.  (R., pp.153-55; Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.)  
The district court reviewed the record and relevant case law, and determined that Andrus had not 
demonstrated unique or compelling circumstances.  (R., pp.162-64.)  As the district court 
recognized, in both Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010), and Berg, supra, counsels’ 
lack of meaningful representation resulted in the respective petitioner’s complaints being 
dismissed without consideration of the merits of their respective claims.  (R., pp.162-63.)  In 
contrast, the claims Andrus raised in his petition for post-conviction relief were not dismissed 
due to counsel’s failure to prosecute the petition, or even because they were merely bare and 
conclusory.  (Id.)  Rather, even assuming counsel’s alleged lack of participation, Andrus’s claims 
were still considered and dismissed on their merits.  (Id.; see also R., pp.86-97.)   
The district court noted that counsel had a duty to communicate with Andrus, but also 
recognized that unless communication could have avoided dismissal on the merits, a failure to 
communicate would be harmless.  (R., p.162, n.2.)  Andrus failed to present any evidence, or 
make an argument, that there were additional facts or legal authority that might have prevented 
summary dismissal of his petition on its merits.  (R., pp.163-64.)  Therefore, Andrus failed to 
show any unique or compelling circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b).  See Ponderosa 
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Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho at 317-18, 870 P.2d at 670-71 (“It would be pointless to vacate a 
summary judgment and reopen the proceeding if the party seeking relief has not shown that it 
can raise genuine factual issues sufficient to defeat the summary judgment motion.”). 
On appeal, Andrus asserts that his undeveloped claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel might have been better developed with more diligent representation in post-conviction 
proceedings, and that this constitutes unique and compelling circumstances.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.10-12.)  Andrus’s argument fails. 
Andrus asserts that he had a meritorious claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing 
to suppress Andrus’s breath test results.  (Appellant’s brief, p.11.)  After taking judicial notice of 
the underlying proceedings (R., pp.83-84), the district court directly and fully addressed the 
merits of this contention in its notice of intent to dismiss Andrus’s post-conviction petition (R., 
pp.90-91).  As the district court noted, where the petitioner alleges that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion would not have been granted 
by the trial court is dispositive of the issue.  (R., p.91 (citing Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 477, 
180 P.3d 511, 516 (Ct. App. 2008).)  The district court correctly determined that a motion to 
suppress would have been denied based on the Court of Appeals’ holding in State v. Stump, 146 
Idaho 857, 860, 203 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Ct. App. 2009), that an officer is not required to “stare 
fixedly” at the subject during the 15-minute waiting period, but may rely on his or her other 
senses, which the officer was in a position to do in Andrus’s underlying case.  (R., p.91.)  Thus, 
Andrus’s claim was correctly dismissed on its merits, and Andrus failed in his Rule 60(b) motion 
to allege any facts demonstrating that counsel—whether active or not—would have had any 
impact on that outcome. 
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Andrus also argues that his claim, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during her 
closing arguments when she noted that Andrus was manipulative, was meritorious.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.11-12.)  It was not.  First, “[a]n application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute 
for an appeal.”  Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997).  Prosecutorial 
misconduct, even if not objected to, is an issue that may be (and routinely is) raised on direct 
appeal, and any “issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited 
and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings.”  I.C. § 19-4901(b).  Second, the 
district court, after quoting from the transcript of the proceedings below and applying the correct 
legal standards, fully addressed this issue on its merits as well.  (R., p.95.)  Andrus failed to show 
in his Rule 60(b) motion that additional filings from counsel would have had any impact on the 
ultimate outcome of this claim.1 
The district court properly exercised its discretion when it denied Andrus’s motion for 
relief under Rule 60(b) because, contrary to his assertions on appeal, Andrus failed to show 
unique and compelling circumstances supporting his motion.  Andrus has failed to show an 
abuse of the district court’s discretion.  The district court’s order denying Andrus’s Rule 60(b) 
motion should be affirmed. 
 
                                            
1  Andrus also asserts that his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
witnesses to rebut the officer’s testimony was supported by the record, but he does not develop 
this argument.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)  Regardless, the district court correctly 
addressed and dismissed this claim on its merits as well.  (R., pp.92-93.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying 
Andrus’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
 DATED this 26th day of April, 2018. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Russell J. Spencer________________________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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